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Abstract 
Climate change and energy security are driving a worldwide renaissance in nuclear power. An Australian nuclear power 
industry has also been seriously investigated by the Australian government and its agencies. This paper provides a 
broad overview of the nuclear fuel cycle and the nuclear power industry. It identifies aspects that are sensitive to 
nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation to help security professionals identify threats and prepare for a 
possible Australian nuclear power industry. 
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INTRODUCTION    
It has been fairly widely accepted for decades in the scientific community that massive amounts of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emitted into the atmosphere by humans would increase the “greenhouse effect” resulting in global warming and 
other climate change. The most recent fourth assessment report of  the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2007)  makes it clear that carbon dioxide is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas affecting the 
Earth’s energy balance, with the primary source being the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). A global warming 
of 0.2˚C per decade is projected over the next two decades and rises of several degrees this century are expected if CO2 
emissions are not reduced.  
In Australia, over 96% of electricity generation (in terms of fuel inputs) is from coal, gas and oil (ABARE, 2009a). 
Hydroelectricity is our main “clean” electricity generation source which does not emit carbon dioxide. Although 
significant growth is likely in other “renewable” sources like wind generators, these are currently not suitable for base 
load power. Nuclear power plants can supply large amounts of base load power and do not emit greenhouse gases. With 
Australia’s natural wealth in uranium the nuclear option is being promoted, by some, as a “clean” source of base load 
power and an effective medium term action to reduce climate change. 
The year 2006 was pivotal in Australia with a nuclear power industry being seriously investigated through two 
comprehensive reports. The first report was commissioned by the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology 
Organisation (ANSTO) to look at the economics of nuclear power in the Australian context (Gittus, 2006). In the 
second half of the year, a taskforce was appointed by the Prime Minister to investigate and report on uranium mining, 
value-added processing, and the contribution of a nuclear energy industry in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2006). In summary, while high commercial and technology barriers could make Australian conversion, enrichment and 
fuel fabrication facilities difficult to build, there was support for an expansion of uranium mining, and nuclear power 
was considered economically feasible. The release in late 2006 of Al Gore’s academy award winning documentary film 
on climate change “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006), enhanced public perceptions of a crisis that is driving the debate on 
nuclear power in Australia.  
Despite having huge natural energy resources, Australia could find its energy security under threat from the 
international community that may not accept our huge carbon footprint. Australia has recently overtaken the United 
States of America as the world’s biggest emitter of CO2 per capita (Maplecroft, 2009), and globally enforced carbon 
emission caps may emerge as part of a global response to climate change. Australia may be forced to quickly reduce our 
reliance on fossil fuels or face sanction. 
This paper provides a broad overview of the nuclear power industry with the nuclear fuel cycle described in sufficient 
detail for security professionals to better appreciate security issues. Reference will be made to those aspects of most 
concern for nuclear terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. Regulation, safeguards and international experience 
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Figure 1 shows a schematic diagram of the nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear fission power reactors. The front end of the 
nuclear reactor can be considered as two stages. Firstly, uranium ore is mined and processed to produce yellowcake 
(U3O8). This normally occurs at or near the mine site. Secondly, specialist facilities are needed to enrich uranium and 
produce fuel that a nuclear power station can use to produce electricity. Finally, the spent fuel is managed through 
storage, reprocessing and waste disposal.  
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of nuclear fission power reactor fuel cycle 
Uranium ore to yellowcake 
Australia has the world’s largest known recoverable uranium deposits (23%) in the world with major producers Canada 
and Kazakhstan account for about 60% of world supply of uranium for nuclear reactors from mines (World Nuclear 
Association, 2009). Natural uranium on Earth is radioactive and made up of 99.3% U-238 and just 0.7% U-235. Both 
U-238 and U-235 are alpha particle emitters with half lives of 4.5 billion years and 704 million years respectively 
(Thornton and Rex, 2006). The long half lives and dispersed nature of the uranium deposits make them not particularly 
radioactive. In the financial year 2007/2008, the three currently operating Australian mines at Ranger (NT), Olympic 
Dam (SA), and a small mine at Beverly (SA), produced a total of 10,101 tonnes of yellowcake (ABARE, 2009b). 
Yellowcake has a low specific radioactivity and is transported in 200 litre drums and loaded into shipping containers for 
enrichment overseas. World uranium mining will probably need to greatly expand in the coming decades due to an 
increasing number of nuclear power stations and a probable reduction in (currently 40%) nuclear fuel derived from 
decommissioned American and Russian nuclear warheads (ASNO, 2008) under the Treaty on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START). 
Conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication 
Through chemical reactions, yellowcake (U3O8) is converted to uranium hexafluoride (UF6) before the technologically 
challenging task of enriching the U-235 abundance from its natural 0.7% to between 3% and 5%. This is necessary for 
use in almost all nuclear power reactors as it is the U-235 isotope that is fissile and can therefore produce energy. 
Whilst other enrichment methods have been used in the past or are under development, the centrifuge method now 
dominates the international uranium enrichment industry. When uranium hexafluoride is fed into a swiftly rotating 
cylinder (centrifuge) there is a slight separation of the isotopes with the lighter 235UF6 having a slightly higher 
concentration near the axis and the heavier 238UF6 having a slightly higher concentration in the outer regions. By 
withdrawing uranium hexafluoride from near the axis and repeating the process through a series of centrifuges the 
uranium hexafluoride can be enriched to reactor grade. The centrifuge method requires about one tenth of the energy 
required in the diffusion method that was common up to the 1970s. Urenco have been building a national enrichment 
facility in New Mexico to supply the US market using state of the art centrifuge technology with first production 
expected towards the end of 2009 (Urenco, 2009). After enrichment, uranium hexafluoride is converted to uranium 
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Enrichment of the U-235 isotope to between 3% and 20% is referred to as low-enriched uranium. Greater than 20% is 
high-enriched uranium with more than 90% considered weapons grade. Commercial enrichment technology and 
expertise could be fairly easily adapted to produce weapons grade uranium for use in a nuclear weapons program. Much 
effort is therefore devoted to restricting this highly sensitive dual use technology as a critical step in preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
The usually unwanted U-235 deficient tails, known as depleted uranium, does have uses in other areas due to its 
chemical properties and high specific gravity of 18.7. It is found in counterweights (including keels of yachts) and in 
highly penetrating anti-tank ammunition. 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT 
Nuclear power plants 
The World Nuclear Association (2009, August) reported that there are 436 operating nuclear power plants worldwide 
generating 372 GW of electricity. The two most common reactor types are the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) and 
the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) with 260 and 92 plants respectively (Hore-Lacy, 2003). A succinct and up to date 
overview of current and proposed nuclear reactor types can be found in Norman, Worrall and Hesketh (2007). 
At the heart of nuclear power is the induced fission process that occurs in the reactor core. When U-235 absorbs a 
thermal (slow) neutron, the compound U-236 nucleus created quickly splits into two daughter nuclei and two or three 











0 3  
There are two important aspects to the nuclear fission reaction. Firstly the energy produced from U-235 fission is 
enormous and over a million times more than that produced by burning the same mass of coal. The daily requirements 
for a 1000MW power plant is about 3 kilograms of U-235 compared with about 8 million kilograms of coal (Thornton 
and Rex, 2006). Secondly, the fission produces neutrons that, when slowed down (moderated), may be absorbed by 
other U-235 nuclei to produce a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction. Details of how the nuclear reaction is controlled, 
neutrons moderated, and heat energy transferred away to electrical generators can be found in most university level 
physics textbooks including those by Thornton and Rex (2006), Serway and Jewett (2008), and Halliday, Resnick and 
Walker (2008).   
In addition to power reactors, there are over 250 research reactors in the world where the two primary functions are to 
produce high flux neutron beams for material science research and (through irradiation) manufacture 
radiopharmaceuticals for nuclear medicine. Some of these reactors use high-enriched uranium of up to 95% U-235, 
which unfortunately is also suitable for nuclear weapons. The new Australian research reactor, OPEL, uses low-
enriched uranium (just) of 20%, which improves security and nuclear safeguards (ANSTO, 2005). Research reactors 
typically require higher enrichment than reactors optimised for commercial power generation. In addition, there are 
breeder reactors (Thornton and Rex, 2006) where fast neutrons from U-235 fission are absorbed by U-238, which then 
beta decays to produce (breed) Plutonium (Pu-239) that is also fissile. Inherent problems with breeder reactors make 
them relatively uncommon. 
Spent fuel management: storage and reprocessing 
After 1-2 years, the used (or spent) nuclear fuel elements need to be removed from the reactor. Typically this used fuel 
is about 95% U-238, 1% Pu-239 (from transmutation of U-238 when a fast neutron is absorbed), 1% U-235, and 3% 
fission waste products (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). These waste products are highly radioactive and would be 
most dangerous if they were acquired by terrorists. Interim storage on site in large cooling ponds is required for several 
years to provide radiation protection, remove heat from further fission events, and (with the decay of short life 
radioactive isotopes) make the material easier to handle later. 
The spent fuel is either moved for reprocessing (after a few years of interim storage) or is left as waste until final waste 
storage facilities are ready. Although technologies for storing waste more permanently are being developed, the current 
thinking is to place suitably sealed waste in deep and stable geological repositories. Former Australian Prime Minister 
Bob Hawke has recently called on Australia to consider developing a nuclear waste industry that could be a source of 
income and contribute to energy security worldwide given geologically safe and remote storage options (The 
Australian, 2009). 
Reprocessing begins with the dissolving of spent fuel rods in acid to separate uranium and plutonium from the 3% 
waste products from the fission (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). These waste products are highly radioactive and 
require long term storage in drums. The uranium recovered can be recycled by going through the conversion and 
enrichment process again. It can also be used with the plutonium, which like uranium also produces energy through 
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neutron induced fission, to produce mixed oxide (MOX) fuel rods. One of many safeguards in a reprocessing plant is to 
avoid storing separated plutonium by mixing in a 50/50 ratio with uranium (Pickett, 2008) 
 
SAFETY, NON-PROLIFERATION AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM 
Nuclear weapons: U-235 or Pu-239? 
Plutonium has clear advantages over uranium for the construction and delivery of nuclear weapons. Firstly, Pu-239 can 
undergo induced fission more easily than U-235 as it captures both slow and fast neutrons. Secondly, the Pu-239 fission 
reaction also produces on average 2.7 neutrons per fission compare with 2.3 neutrons for U-235. A runaway chain 
reaction is therefore easier to create for Pu-239 which allows for the development of smaller nuclear warheads that can 
be more easily delivered by ballistic missiles where size and shape are critical. Pu-239 is an alpha emitter with a half 
life of 24 thousand years and is highly toxic. 
Pakistan and the Khan network 
The case of Pakistan and the Kahn network is illustrative of how easily technology and expertise can proliferate across 
international borders (Nuclear Engineering International Magazine, 2004). Back in the 1970’s, Pakistan began acquiring 
enrichment technology including the design details for advanced Zippe-type centrifuges (after German Scientist Gernot 
Zippe) from a European enrichment facility operated by Urenco. Pakistan was able to develop its own enrichment 
capability and successfully tested a nuclear fission bomb in 1998. It is believed that this technology, through the Abdul 
Khan network, was sold on the black market to Libya, North Korea and Iran. Although Libya has since renounced its 
nuclear program, North Korea announced its first successful nuclear fission bomb test on October 9, 2006, and Iran, 
despite UN sanctions (UN Security Council, 2008), is expanding its uranium enrichment capabilities. Other Middle 
Eastern countries are also investigating the nuclear option. 
Regulation and safeguards 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established in 1957 as an independent organisation within the 
United Nations (UN) to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. The three main pillars of nuclear 
cooperation that underpin its mission are the promotion of safeguards and verification, safety and security, and science 
and technology. The IAEA has also responded to recent terrorist attacks through its coordination and strengthening of 
international approaches to promote nuclear security (IAEA, 2007).    
Diversion of nuclear material and technology in the nuclear power industry to nuclear weapons programs is and has 
been a major problem and concern of the international community. The 1968 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Treaty (NPT) aimed to restrict nuclear weapons to the five nuclear powers at the time: USA, Soviet Union (now 
Russia), China, France and the United Kingdom. Since the NPT came into force in 1970, India, Pakistan and North 
Korea have conducted nuclear weapons tests, Israel is believed to be a nuclear power and Iran is believed to be close to 
becoming a nuclear power. India, Pakistan and Israel have never been signatories to the NPT. South Africa was a small 
nuclear power before deciding to voluntarily disarm and Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus also briefly possessed 
nuclear weapons (Doyle, 2008). Given that much nuclear technology and expertise is common to the nuclear power 
industry and nuclear weapons programs, it has always been difficult for the IAEA, as the international body responsible, 
to inspect and verify solely peaceful intentions or operations. Additional protocols have been introduced to strengthen 
the non-proliferation safeguards in the NPT, but there was no general agreement to make these compulsory at the last 
five-yearly NPT review conference (NPT Review Conference, 2005). In September 2009 United States President 
Barack Obama chaired an historic summit of the security council which adopted resolution 1887 (2009) with 14 heads 
of state for broad progress on long-stalled efforts to staunch the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure reductions 
in existing weapons stockpiles, as well as control over fissile material (UN Security Council SC/9746, 2009).  
In Australia, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) within the Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is charged with ensuring that nuclear materials and items are used only for authorised 
purposes and that our international treaty commitments, including the NPT, are met. ASNO also reports to the IAEA 
and arranges site visits. Australia’s nuclear reactor at Lucas heights and three uranium mines with associated storage 
and transport operations are major responsibilities for ASNO. An Australian nuclear power industry would result in a 
huge increase in the storage and transport of radioactive materials. Further details of ASNO’s role can be obtained in 
the 2007-2008 Annual Report (ASNO, 2008). Note that health and safety relating to radiation is mostly regulated by the 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA, 2009).  
Proliferation and nuclear terrorism 
Access to enrichment technology and expertise is the biggest stumbling block in producing the highly enriched U-235 
required for a uranium bomb from uranium ore. Reprocessing technology of spent fuel rods from power reactors is 
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critical to extracting the Pu-239 required for the more versatile Plutonium bomb. It would seem logical that 
international and domestic concerns for the proliferation of nuclear weapons may limit the scope of an Australian 
nuclear power industry. However, a key finding of the second report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) is that 
increased Australian involvement in the fuel cycle would not change the proliferation risks or make Australia’s energy 
grid more vulnerable to terrorist attack. Given international experience the author does not agree with this finding with 
respect to proliferation risks. 
A nuclear power industry would create additional sources of highly radioactive material that would need to be secured 
at nuclear facilities and in transportation between facilities around the country. This material could be diverted for use 
in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) to harm and terrorise a population. Natural disasters and accidental human 
intervention can also result in the dispersal of radioactive material (Swan, 2008). The ability to detect small amounts of 
radioactivity in a range of situations has become a bigger priority with increasing resources being allocated to tackle the 
problem. For example, in 2007 the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) of the US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) announced 10 contracts worth US$8.8 million to perform exploratory research in advanced nuclear 
detection technology (DHS, 2007)  
The difficulties of ensuring that access to sensitive information, materials, technology and critical people are 
appropriately controlled would be a substantial and complex undertaking for security professionals. For example, major 
infrastructure, like nuclear power plants and enrichment facilities would require high level physical security and 
effective policies and procedures for materials and personnel. Transportation of sensitive/dangerous materials over large 
distances is an issue and the monitoring and guarding of highly radioactive waste in remote depositories would also 
need to be addressed.  
AN AUSTRALIAN NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY? 
The British Prime Minister recently signalled that he would like Britain to play a major role in building an extra 1,000 
nuclear power stations around the world (The Independent, 2008). However, the change of federal government (from 
Coalition to Labour) in late 2007 has reduced the likelihood of Australia building nuclear power stations in the near 
future, although there is growing pressure within the ALP to more seriously revisit this option in response to climate 
change. In any case, the Australian uranium mining industry is preparing for rapid expansion and according to two 
recent comprehensive reports (Gittus, 2006 ; Commonwealth of Australia, 2006) nuclear power is a realistic option for 
Australia. 
The ANSTO report (Gittus, 2006) concludes that nuclear power is demonstrably the safest way of generating electricity 
and is an excellent source of supplies. It is reported that the fatality rate per unit of electricity is one thousand times as 
great for coal, oil and gas than it is for nuclear. It is estimated that although the risk of a terrorist attack on an Australian 
nuclear power station is 50% higher since 9-11, the risk is still very low. This paper seeks to broadly identify critical 
segments in the nuclear fuel cycle for terrorism and/or proliferation that have the potential to cause great harm. The 
overall security risks are significant and would need to be mitigated.  
Australia’s current role in the world nuclear power industry is that of a major miner of uranium ore and exporter of 
yellowcake. Australia has no conversion or enrichment capability, no fuel fabrication facility, no nuclear power stations 
and no reprocessing facilities. Our reactor expertise revolves around the scientific use of one small research reactor at 
Lucas Heights near Sydney. An Australian nuclear power industry would require a huge influx of technology, expertise, 
and radioactive materials which together would have far reaching and complex security implications. Adapting from 
international best practice where possible, there would be a need to develop expertise for the Australian context to 
provide security for whatever segment of the nuclear industry we chose to develop. Finally, nuclear power is one of 
many highly politicised issues in Australia and that some elements of the community may choose to inflate or deflate 
public perception of risks to suit their own purposes. 
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